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Abstract. In the context of innovation consulting activity, it may happen work-
ing in technical fields characterized by a high competitiveness level. Although 
TRIZ allows reaching innovative ideas in any kind of industry, it does not sug-
gest any tool in order to evaluate the success rate of the invention in the refer-
ence market. During the last years, TRIZ got methodological contributes to 
sharpen the matching between the inventive idea and the actual needs of the 
market, for example the market potential tool. In order to support TRIZ experts 
in selecting the best innovation strategy, this paper introduces a new tool for the 
TRIZ toolbox that takes into account the competitiveness level of the market. 
Several economics works disclose the correlation between the patent-citation 
triadic relationships and the presence of dominant positions of few competitors. 
A patent analysis, focused on triads in patent citation, can inform the TRIZ ex-
pert about potential critical situation able to prevent the success of an inventive 
solution. It can generate an important indicator that helps him in selecting the 
most promising innovation strategy. The method could be integrated in a classic 
TRIZ activity, using commercial patent searching tools. The case study shows 
how to extract this kind of indicator from patent citation environment in Ma-
chine Learning field. 
Keywords: TRIZ, Patent, Patent Thicket, Business Intelligence, Market Struc-
ture 
1 Introduction 
Business Intelligence (BI) comprises the strategies and technologies used by enter-
prises for the data analysis of business information, in order to identify new business 
opportunities with a competitive market advantage [1-4]. Firms make use of BI strat-
egies to support a wide range of business decisions, which include both operational 
(i.e. production, and distribution) and technical (i.e. analysis of data) procedure able 
to improve their own efficiency. In the most recent times, it has been adopted to sup-
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port the product innovation process, minimizing the risk‐management decisions about 
R&D to the minimum.  
In this paper, with the aim to define the structure of the market for innovation, we 
investigate a large pool of patents extracted from Machine Learning field. It is useful 
for ranking of the list of product requirement with highest market potential [5]. 
The market for innovation is particularly characterized by the use of licensing and 
sale of patents which negotiations could both either promote or prevent the diffusion 
of a specific technology, affecting firms’ incentive to invest in further innovation [6]. 
In order to take into account the market structure, while ranking the market poten-
tial of product/process requirements, we present a new method able to incorporate 
both characteristics. By using patent counts as a measure of innovation, in this article 
we propose a procedure which by identifying the presence of possible patent thickets 
we are able to pinpoint the major market players, and all possible constrains faced by 
a new innovator entering into the market. [7] (see section 2). Patent thickets are a 
peculiar characteristic of complex industries. According to the claims made in the 
patents about both physical and methodological components of the patented product 
or process it is likely that the ownership of the exclusive intellectual property right 
can overlap across different economics agents (i.e. firms), preventing their use and 
creating a proper barrier, especially for the follow-on innovation [7]. 
Knowing whether or not there is a patent thicket, before starting the problem solving 
or product innovation activity, is pivotal, as it allows to anticipate and readjust the BI 
strategy before the launch of the product will occur into the market. 
Currently there are no tools able to automatically extract the data necessary to un-
veil the risk to meet with patent thicket; however, there are strategies based on back-
ward and forward citations with which it is possible to obtain indications regarding 
any priority relations between patent pairs (or applicant pairs) [8]. Other useful infor-
mation can be derived from the co-applicant and co-inventors maps, which show col-
laboration and relationships even between different companies [9] that are assumed to 
be competition within the same market, unless R&D cooperation agreements have 
been signed, and then emerging from the co-patenting measurement.. A simple indi-
cation of the presence of patent thickets it is not informative per se, and for that rea-
son the approach we propose would instead suggest the major players in the market, 
highlighting also the relative structure of the market. 
2 Patent Thicket as Measure for Market Structure 
The patent thicket is "a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that 
a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize 
new technology” [7]. It affects the structure of the market, usually characterized by 
cumulative or complementary technologies [10], defending against competi-
tors designing around a single patent [11] and/or building hindrances to the innova-
tion [12–16]. 
A potential new entrant in a specific technological market might be discouraged by 
the presence of a thicket, simply because of the high cost related to the bargaining 
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process which is requested to advance further the innovation. This is even more evi-
dent when the market is characterized by few big players which may have a dominant 
position by owning a large pool of patent, and then conditioning the access to the 
market. According to the complexity of the patent thickets, the new entrant can be 
discouraged by the sticky and costly process, and as a result it would not undertake 
any further investment in the advancement of the new technology [17]. Alternatively, 
whether the investment takes place by licensing agreements and a new technology is 
proposed, due to the initial high cost its diffusion will be limited, preventing future 
advancement in the innovation process. [7]. Galasso and Schankerman [18] show how 
the presence of patent thickets obstruct follow-on research especially in the complex 
industries (for example in information and communications technology, electrical–
electronics and medical instruments). Once we accept that innovation depends mainly 
on the paradigm which sees it as a cumulative process upon which new ideas are gen-
erated, in Gallini [19] we could find a comprehensive review of the literature which 
highlights the issues yielded by the presence of patent thickets. 
2.1 A method for identifying patent thicket  
The strategy to measure the density of a patent thicket proposed by von Graevenitz 
[8] relies on the patent literature cited by the examiner in the search report having 
kind X or Y. He uses the triple (see Fig. 1) of applicants involved in mutual blocking 
citation relationships as a unity of measure of the thicket density. Higher the number 
of triples, worse the hacking through the thicket. 
 
 
  
Fig. 1. Schematic presentation of the structure of triple. A, B and C circles identifies the firms 
involved in triple; the straight lines represent the mutual blocking relationships between firm 
couples (Souce von Graevenitz [8]) 
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Given the complexity of such a type of dimension, it finds some limitation for ap-
plication to BI analysis. The required skills ranging from IT field, especially SQL 
language to querying PATSTAT, the statistical DB published by EPO 
(www.epo.org\searching-for-patents\business\patstat.html), to patent procedural 
knowledge. This makes hard to reproduce the analyses available in literature.  
Furthermore, the method has been proposed in an economical context. It tend to 
make an economic analysis of the market for the main classes of OST-INPI/FhG-ISI 
technology nomenclature [20]. The typical dimension of the patent pools used by von 
Graevenitz is excessively large in order to give an information exploitable by decision 
makers concerning the reference market structure of a specific technical solution. 
Moreover, although the triples count is an interesting method to measure the thick-
et density, it does not take into account the inner balance (or imbalance) of the patent 
portfolios, which explains the effective polarization toward one or two competitors in 
the triple. 
In this article, the authors introduce an algorithm able to automatize the triples ex-
traction process in a delimited technology environment. The output is a navigable 
network of citation links, in which the user can identify the main players, taking into 
account the contribution of the balance/imbalance information. 
3 Triples extraction method for identify patent thicket 
To extract the information about the possible presence of patent thicket in a techno-
logical domain related to a patent application, we suggest a modified triples evalua-
tion algorithm. 
It works in a patent pool selected in a more refined way than OST-INPI/FhG-ISI 
(or NACE) classification, considering the reference application field only. Thereby 
the measure of thicket density is ‘local’ and the approach can index the main players 
involved in thickening. 
The algorithm gives three different indexes about the triple inner imbalance. 
First it shows the number of citations for each couple in both directions (see Fig. 
2). This might unveil that one (or two) of the player involved in the triple is not effec-
tively disturbing the other two because its blocking patents are limited in number. 
Therefore, the other two applicants might not actually worry about the triple and con-
trol the market as a duopoly (or monopoly). 
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Fig. 2. A generic triple schema showing all citation relationships between the players. The 
arrows start from the cited player and go to the citing one (blocking direction). 
The second index refers to the inner relative strength due to the portfolios size 
comparison of the triple players. The triples with an important imbalance due to this 
reason may suffer the effect of dominant positioning of one (or two) player. Thus, the 
actual configuration of the thicket tends to become a monopoly (or duopoly). 
The last index measures the ratio between the target-technology-related portfolio of 
a firm in the triple and its whole patent portfolio. It indexes which is the effective 
interest of a single player involved in the triple to the target technology, and its rela-
tive market. A high ratio means the player considers strategic the target technology 
and the involving in triples could be a great fail risk. 
The second index gives us the information about the inner imbalance between the 
players in a triple, while the third index shows the importance/interest of the target 
technology for each player (see Fig. 3). 
 
Fig. 3.   A visualization of the imbalances inside a triple. The arrow thickness indexes the 
weight to the bilateral citation relationship, starting from the blocking player and pointing to the 
blocked one. The dotted circles indicate the dimension of the patent portfolios, related to the 
target technology. The number of the documents involved in the triple is proportional to the 
area of the grey circle. 
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The assessment on potential imbalance in triples is a useful indication that could be 
integrated into the BI tools in order to unveil the actual structure of the market to the 
decision makers and let them to make choices in a more informed way. 
Fig. 4 shows the algorithm used to compute the triples, considering filters in the 
choice of patent documents, application activity of the firms and inner imbalance in 
the triples. 
 
Fig. 4. The algorithm for the extraction from a technology-based patent pool of triples and 
related data. The first filtering option filters documents by filing year and applicants by mini-
mum number of applications [10]. Second filter acts on the lifetime (in years) of a bilateral 
citation [10]. Filter 3 considers the imbalance parameters (relative portfolios dimension, docu-
ments involved in triple and number of bilateral citations) 
As an example of the application of our proposed method we present the case of a 
pool of patent extract from Machine Learning patent field, and due to possible time 
lags in the patent office register update, we censor the last two years as suggested by 
the patent literature. We extracted all patents from Google, IBM and Microsoft focus-
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ing on machine learning and artificial intelligence. From Figure 5 we can observe this 
market segment is dominated by the presence of three major players, Google, IBM, 
and Microsoft Technology. We use citation as a measure of a patent market value 
[21], and in particular number of co-citation to identify the extent of the patent thick-
ets among the major players. It emerges clearly that both Google and IBM tend to 
interact and make citation in a reciprocal relationship mainly with Microsoft Technol-
ogy Licensing. Whereas the co-co-citation numbers between Google and IBM drop 
by almost 30 per cent compare to the same measure they have with Microsoft Tech-
nology. From this scenario it looks like that Microsoft Technology Licensing play a 
role as a leader controlling the number of citations which the other two players. This 
very preliminary analysis would suggest an oligopoly given the presence of three 
firms (with other two very small), where the one which owns the larger number of 
patents might play an important role in controlling the market entrants. Of course, a 
furthermore details analysis is needed to be able to understand if any illegal behaviour 
is in place (i.e. collusion). However, from this simple picture would it be already 
enough to confirm the presence of high barriers to entry which could discourage the 
progress of this specific technology, leaving if in the hands of few actors. 
4 Conclusions 
Due to the influence the competitiveness level might exert onto the success/failure of 
an inventive solution, its assessment is an important and strategic information for 
innovation activities. 
This article gives to TRIZ experts a new tool that aims to assess the competitive-
ness level of the reference market. Using quantitative data from patents in the target 
technology field, the tool supports the choice of the innovation strategy for a firm that 
is looking for a new technology, especially when it operates in a complex market. 
Although an economical research would be more accurate than the proposed meth-
od, the latter is very cheaper. In fact, while the first needs a high expertise in both 
economics and patents, the proposed method can run on currently available patent 
searching tools. This allows the TRIZ experts to carry out this analysis by themselves. 
Whether the result would be highlight a critical situation, a deeper analysis would be 
appropriate. 
The method extracts citations data from patent database in order to compute triples 
and measure their inner balance. A great relative difference might highlight a domi-
nant position. 
It has been tested in machine learning field and it shown a dominant positioning of 
Microsoft, IBM and Google. The experimentation proves and highlights the risk for 
an unaware entrant to incur in unexpected extra charge due to the hard licensing bar-
gaining. 
The method is valid for any technical domain involved in patents. 
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Fig. 5. Most interesting triple isolated by the algorithm in Machine Learning sector involving 
Google, IBM and Microsoft. The numbers near the circles indicate the number of patents held 
by the firm, while number on arrows shows blocking patents (or cited patents): e.g. IBM cited 
Google 100 times. 
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